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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

SCOPE

This memorandum discusses planning as a mode of individual criminal responsibility
under international criminal law. It covers the legal elements of the crime of planning and
illustrates the various conduct associated with planning within the context of war crimes. Since
the bulk of today‟s jurisprudence on this topic comes mainly from the ad hoc tribunals, the
memorandum is limited to case law from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (“ICTR”).
B.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

i.

International Tribunals Do Not Rely on Planning to Obtain a Conviction.

Although the international tribunals have indicted a number of individuals in recent years
for the planning of war crimes, no individual has been convicted solely on the charge of
“planning.” One key reason is that the prosecution usually can obtain a conviction without
proving planning. Since the prosecution typically includes all the forms of criminal
participation—planning, instigating, ordering, committing, and aiding and abetting—in an
indictment, planning often becomes the least important among the charges. For example, in the
case of Jean Mpambara, the ICTR Trial Chamber recognized that despite the indictment of
Mpambara on planning, the prosecution‟s closing brief and final arguments made few, if any
references, to “planning.”1

This memo was prepared for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. It
addresses “planning” under International Criminal Law, specifically the legal elements and the
scope of the term to "plan" a crime.
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ii.

The Lack of Reliance on Planning Has Created a Void in the Jurisprudence
of this Mode of Individual Criminal Responsibility.

The ad hoc tribunals have spent little time discussing the legal elements of planning and
applying the elements to the facts of cases. A few seminal cases in the ICTY and ICTR make up
the bulk of the jurisprudence on the physical and mental elements of planning. Furthermore, the
tribunals have not adequately distinguished planning from some other forms of criminal
participation, namely aiding and abetting and complicity. 2
iii.

Despite the Cursory Treatment of Planning in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, this
Mode of Criminal Participation Presents Unique Challenges and
Opportunities for the Prosecution and Defense.

After reviewing the ICTY and ICTR case law, I identified the most common factors that
the trial and appeals chambers consider when discussing the role of the accused in planning.
Based on these, I created categories of objective and subjective indicators of planning. The
objective factors to consider are the accused‟s: (1) communications, (2) use of weapons and
offensive use of force, (3) physical presence at the scene of the crime, (4) position of authority,
and (5) relationships with other war criminals. I further divided the category of communications
into (a) meetings, (b) public statements, and (c) letters, lists, and other documents. The only
subjective indicator of an accused‟s planning is evidence of a shift or change in attitude.
In analyzing these various factors, both the prosecution and defense should answer the
following key questions.

1

Prosecutor v. Jean Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment, fn. 2 (Sep. 11, 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
2

See William A. Schabas, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 285-303
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) for an extensive discussion of complicity [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 4].
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1. Did the accused‟s conduct contribute substantially to the commission of the crime (i.e.,
the requisite actus reus)? An accused‟s conduct need not have a direct effect on the
commission of the crime.
2. Did the accused design a crime with the intent that the crime be committed, or did the
accused design an “an act or omission” with the awareness of the substantial likelihood
that the commission of a crime would result (i.e., the requisite mens rea)?
3. Are witnesses able to describe specifics, for example, location, time, people present,
meeting agenda, and degree of accused‟s participation in meetings?
4. Is there a recognizable pattern or inconsistencies in the accused‟s actions?
Moreover, it is useful to approach the events in a chronological order. The ICTY and
ICTR Trial Chambers repeatedly emphasize in their judgments that even if the accused is not
liable at one stage of the planning, his liability may still be decided based upon subsequent
events.3

II.

“PLANNING” WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL STATUTES
Planning is a form of criminal participation in international law. Article 7(1) of the ICTY

Statute4 5 and Article 6(1) of the ICTR6 7 Statute both include planning among other modes of
3

Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, ¶ 458 (June 7, 2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
ICTY Statute art. 7(1) (stating, “[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.” (emphasis added)) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
4

Id. at art. 8 (addressing the Former Yugoslavia Tribunal‟s territorial and temporal jurisdiction, which
extends to crimes committed within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—including its
land surface, airspace, and territorial waters. The time period covered begins on January 1, 1991).
5

ICTR Statute Art. 6(1) (stating, “[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the
6
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participation for which an accused person may incur individual criminal responsibility. In all,
there are five forms of participation—planning, instigating, ordering, committing, and aiding and
abetting—that cover various stages in the commission of a crime.
A.

PLANNING: DEFINITIONS AND LEGAL ELEMENTS
Our current understanding of planning as a form of criminal participation, for which an

accused may be held individually responsible, primarily is rooted in the recent jurisprudence of
the ICTY and ICTR Tribunals. Beginning with the trial judgment of the ICTY in the Tadić
case, 8 the ad hoc tribunals have been developing and refining the legal elements of the various
modes of criminal participation, to include planning. The Trial Chamber in Tadić reviewed a
number of international conventions 9 and post-World War II judgments10 to identify a set of
criteria that would assist the Chamber in linking the conduct of the accused to crimes that he
might have played a role in, but did not physically perpetrate himself.11 The Chamber concluded
the following:
First, there is a requirement of intent, which involves awareness of
the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision to
participate by planning, instigating, ordering, committing or
otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime.
present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.” (emphasis added)) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8]..
Id. at Art. 7 (addressing the Rwanda Tribunal‟s territorial and temporal jurisdiction, which extends to
crimes committed within Rwanda—including its land surface and airspace—and neighboring states. The
time period covered is between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994).
7

8

Gideon Boas et al., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER LIBRARY: FORMS OF
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, vol. 1, 344 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5] (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9]).
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T at ¶ 663-64, 666 (referenced in Boas, supra 8, at 345) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
9

10

Id. at ¶ 675-87.

Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T at ¶ 673 (referenced in Boas, supra 8, at 344) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 9].
11
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Second, the prosecution must prove that there was participation in
that the conduct of the accused contributed to the commission of
the illegal act.12

As this statement describes, each mode of criminal participation has two parts—a mental
element or mens rea and a physical element or actus reus. In order to establish individual
criminal responsibility, the ICTR Trial Chamber reiterated in the Kayishema and Ruzindana
judgment that the prosecution must satisfy a “two stage test”: a demonstration of “(i)
participation, that is the accused‟s conduct contributed to the commission of an illegal act, and
(ii) knowledge or intent, that is awareness by the actor of his participation in a crime.”13
The following sections explain in detail these physical and mental elements associated with the
planning of a crime under international criminal law.
i.

Actus Reus
Generally, an individual can be held liable for planning a crime only when that crime is

actually perpetrated.14 For example, in the ICTY Kordić and Čerkez case, the Appeals Chamber
explained that “[t]he actus reus of „planning‟ requires that one or more persons design the
criminal conduct constituting one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.”15
Similarly, the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Mpambara judgment stated, “[p]lanning is the
formulation of a design by which individuals will execute a crime.”16
Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T at ¶ 674 (emphasis added) (quoted in Boas, supra note 8, at 345)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
12

13

Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 198 (May 21, 1999)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
14

Boas, supra note 8, at 357 n.91 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 26 (Dec. 17, 2004) (emphasis
added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
15

16

Mpambara, ICTR-01-65-T at ¶ 20 (Sep. 11, 2006) (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 27].
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The ICTY and ICTR Statutes explicitly state that an individual becomes liable for
planning the following crimes only when the offenses have been committed: Crimes against
Humanity, 17 Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Convention and of Additional
Protocol II,18 Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 19 and Violations of the Laws
and Customs of War. There is, however, an exception in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes for the
crime of genocide. Given the seriousness of the crime of genocide, an individual may incur
criminal liability for merely planning attempted genocide. 20 The ICTR Trial Chamber in the
Musema judgment explained this as follows:
The Chamber observes that the principle of individual criminal
responsibility, under Article 6(1), implies that the planning or the
preparation of a crime actually must lead to its commission.
However, the Chamber notes that Article 2(3) of the Statute,
pertaining to the crime of genocide, foresees the possibility for the
Tribunal to prosecute attempted genocide, among other acts. Since
attempt is by definition an inchoate crime, inherent in the criminal
conduct per se, it may be punishable as a separate crime
irrespective of whether or not the intended crime is
accomplished.21

17

Crimes Against Humanity are covered by ICTY Statute Art. 5 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 7], and ICTR Statute Art. 3 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
18

Violations of Art. 3 Common to the Geneva Convention and of Additional Protocol II are covered by
ICTR Statute Art. 4 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
19

Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are covered by ICTY Statute Art. 2 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
20

Genocide is covered by ICTY Statute Art. 4 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7], and
ICTR Statute Art. 2 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8]. See Boas, supra note 8, at 358
n.91 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5] (quoting Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 193 (2003) (“[I]t would seem that the gravity of international crimes (or at least the most
serious among them) may warrant the conclusion that planning the commission of one or more such
crimes is punishable per se even if the crime is not actually perpetrated.”).
21

Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 115 (Jan. 27, 2000)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20]. See also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 34 (Dec. 6, 1999) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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(a)

An Accused‟s Conduct Must Make a Substantial Contribution to the Commission
of the Crime

Although the Trial Chamber in the Tadić judgment only addressed planning in a cursory
manner, its extensive treatment of aiding and abetting has informed subsequent trial chambers on
the topic of planning. The Chamber concluded in Tadić that in order for an accused to be found
culpable of aiding and abetting his conduct must have had a “direct and substantial effect on the
commission of the illegal act.”22 The Tadić judgment acknowledged that there is no definition of
“substantial,” but that the Nuremberg cases and other sources of customary law make “clear”
that the “substantial contribution requirement calls for a contribution that in fact has an effect on
the commission of the crime.”23 Within the context of aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber in
the Tadić case provided the following examples to illustrate the point.
[I]f there had been no poison gas or gas chambers in the Zyklon B
cases, mass exterminations would not have been carried out in the
same manner. The same analysis applies to the cases where the
men were prosecuted for providing lists of names to German
authorities. Even in these cases where the act in complicity was
significantly removed from the ultimate illegal result, it was clear
that the actions of the accused had a substantial and direct effect
on the commission of the illegal act. . . .24
In the subsequent ICTY Čelebići25 and Aleksovski cases, 26 the Trial Chambers relied on
the analysis in the Tadić judgment and “appear to have extended it to planning, instigating, and

22

Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T at ¶ 688-89 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

23

Id. at ¶ 688.

24

Id. (emphasis added).

Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landžo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment (Nov. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter Čelibići Trial Judgment] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15].
25

26

Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment (June 25, 1999) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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ordering,”27 beyond the limited scope of aiding and abetting in Tadić. The Čelebići judgment
specifically endorsed the direct and substantial requirement, stating:
[I]n order for there to be individual criminal responsibility for
degrees of involvement in a crime under the Tribunal‟s jurisdiction
. . . . The requisite actus reus for such responsibility is constituted
by an act of participation which in fact contributes to, or has an
effect on, the commission of the crime. Hence, this participation
must have „a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the
illegal act.‟28
(b)

An Accused‟s Conduct Does Not Need to Directly Contribute to the Commission
of the Crime.

The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Aleksovski judgment abandoned the “direct” portion of
the contribution element and explained that “[i]t is unnecessary to prove that a cause-effect
relationship existed between participation and the commission of the crime. The act of
participation need merely have significantly facilitated the perpetration of the crime.”29
Presumably, the Trial Chamber considered “significantly” and “substantially” to be synonymous
terms.
Moreover, the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case espoused a
similar view, stating, “[i]t is not presupposed that the accused must be present at the scene of the
crime, nor that his contribution be a direct one.”30 Rather, the Trial Chamber emphatically

27

Boas, supra note 8, at 345 n.9 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]
(referencing Čelibići Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21 at ¶ 326; Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T at ¶
61).
Čelibići Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T at ¶ 326 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 15].
28

29

Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T at ¶ 61(emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 12].
30

Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T at ¶ 200 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 21].
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asserted, “[w]hat is clear is that the contribution to the [criminal] undertaking be a substantial
one, and this is a question of fact for the Trial Chamber to consider.” 31
With respect to planning, specifically, the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Semanza judgment
also rejected the notion that an accused‟s conduct must “directly” effect the commission of a
crime. In that case, the Trial Chamber only required that an accused‟s “level of participation
must be substantial, such as formulating a criminal plan or endorsing a plan proposed by
another.”32
ii.

Mens Rea
The mental element or mens rea essentially is the same for all five modes of criminal

participation. The ICTR Trial Chamber in the Akayesu judgment explained that “[t]he forms of
participation referred to in Article 6 (1) [of the ICTR Statute] cannot render their perpetrator
criminally liable where he did not act knowingly, and even where he should have had such
knowledge.”33
In 2000, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Blaškić case formulated a new interpretation of
the mens rea requirement. The Trial Chamber stated, “[p]roof is required that whoever planned,
instigated, or ordered the commission of a crime possessed the criminal intent, that is, that he
directly or indirectly intended that the crime in question be committed.”34 In introducing this
new concept of criminal intent, the Chamber failed to explain what is meant by direct and

31

Id. at ¶ 199.

32

Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T , Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 380 (May 15, 2003)
(emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
33

Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 479 (Sept. 2, 1998) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 278 (March 3, 2000) (emphasis added)
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11]. See Boas, supra note 8, at 347 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
34

11

indirect intent. Nearly one year later, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Kordić and Čerkez
judgment reiterated this same “direct and indirect intent dichotomy.” 35 The Trial Chamber
stated, without further explanation, “[a]n accused will only be held responsible for planning,
instigating or ordering a crime if he directly or indirectly intended that the crime be
committed.”36
A few months later, the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Bagilishema case referred only to
general criminal intent—“that the [accused] intended that the crime be committed.”37 Finally, in
December 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kordić and Čerkez judgment provided the
most nuanced description of the mental element. The Appeals Chamber held that mens rea could
be established “if the perpetrator acted with direct intent in relation to his own planning,
instigating, or ordering.”38 Further, the Appeals Chamber added, specifically with respect to
planning:
[A] person who plans an act or omission with the awareness of the
substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the
execution of that plan, has the requisite mens rea for establishing
responsibility under Article 7(1) of the [ICTY] Statute pursuant to
planning. Planning with such awareness has to be regarded as
accepting that crime. 39
The Appeals Chamber‟s decision to describe direct intent in one statement, followed by a
discussion of the accused‟s degree of “awareness,” appears to be an attempt to articulate the
difference between direct intent and indirect intent. Together, these two statements—evidence of
35

Boas, supra note 8, at 348 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].

Kordić & Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-T at ¶ 386 (Feb. 26, 2001) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
13].
36

37

Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T at ¶ 31 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

Kordić & Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 29 (Dec. 17, 2004) (emphasis added) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
38

39

Id. at ¶ 31.
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direct intent to bring about the commission of the crime or awareness of the substantial
likelihood of the commission of the crime—establish the most explicit mens rea standard for
planning, to date.40
Impact of the Indirect-Intent Mental Element on the Physical Element of Planning
The Appeals Chamber in the Kordić and Čerkez judgment described the actus reus of
planning as “requir[ing] that one or more persons design the criminal conduct constituting one or
more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated.”41 When the Appeals Chamber chose to factor
the accused‟s degree of awareness into the mental element of planning, it created “an alternative
physical element” for planning. That is, instead of designing the criminal conduct, the accused
“need only design „an act or omission,‟42 provided he is aware of the substantial likelihood that
the physical perpetrator will commit a crime in the realization of that act or omission.”43
To summarize, an accused may be held liable for planning only if: (1) his conduct
substantially contributes to the commission of the crime; and (2) the accused designs a crime
with the intent that the crime be committed or the accused designs “an act or omission” with the
awareness of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would result. Finally, the
accused‟s conduct need not have a direct effect on the commission of the crime.

40

See Boas, supra note 8, at 352 n.54 (explaining that many judgments in the ad hoc tribunals have failed
to mention any mental element at all for planning even when they have discussed the physical elements of
planning). See generally Boas, supra note 8, at 352, 429 (discussing the lack of jurisprudence in the ad
hoc tribunals with respect to the requisite mental elements for specific-intent crimes, such as genocide and
persecution as a crime against humanity) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
Kordić & Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 26 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 14].
41

42

Id. at ¶ 31.

43

Boas, supra note 8, at 353.
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iii.

Unique Attributes of Planning as a Mode of Criminal Participation
Antonio Cassese, international law professor and former Judge and President of the

ICTY, describes, in general terms, that “[p]lanning consists of devising, agreeing upon with
others, preparing, and arranging for the commission of a crime.” 44 Archbold on International
Criminal Courts elaborates further that “[e]ven though an individual may not physically commit
a crime under the Statute [e.g., ICTY or ICTR], he or she will still be liable when he participates
in planning a crime.”45
(a)

The Number of People it Takes to Make a “Plan”

In the first ICTR judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber defined planning
as “implying that one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime at
both the preparatory and execution phases.”46 Therefore, one person, acting alone, is capable of
planning and could be culpable for the commission of a crime. For example, in the case of JeanBosco Barayagwiza, the ICTR Trial Chamber convicted him of essentially single-handedly
planning the extermination of Tutsi civilians in the town of Gisenyi, Rwanda. 47 By contrast, the
ICTY Trial Chamber convicted Mladen Naletilić, a Bosnian Croat paramilitary commander, for
his role in “drawing up, together with others, a plan to transfer the Muslim civilian population
out of the Bosnian village of Sovići.”48
44

Antonio Cassese, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 225 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2008) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
45

ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 503 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
46

Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 480 (emphasis added) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

47

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence
(Dec. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Barayagwiza Trial Judgment] [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
26]. See discussion infra pp. 33-4.
Boas, supra note 8, at 355 (emphasis added) (referencing Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, Case
No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 127, 131-32 (Mar. 31, 2003) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
19]).
48
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(b)

Liability for either Creating or Endorsing a Plan

To reiterate, the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Akayesu judgment stated that the accused
must “[c]ontemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory and execution
phases.” No ad hoc tribunal has explained what this phrase means, although a number of
judgments have held the same view. 49 In Forms of Responsibility in International Law, the
authors offer one possible meaning: “[t]hat the planner must design all aspects of the criminal
activity, including not only when and how the planned conduct will be carried out, but also the
preliminary steps the physical perpetrator must take in order to carry through with the conduct at
a later time.”50
Moreover, an individual may be culpable for his endorsement of a plan. In 2001, the
ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment in the Bagilishema case first held that “[t]he level of participation
must be substantial, such as formulating a criminal plan or endorsing a plan proposed by
another.”51 For example, in the case of Dario Kordić, a senior Bosnian Croat politician, the
Appeals Chamber upheld the lower chamber‟s conviction, which found him guilty of planning. 52
The Appeals Chamber determined that Kordić, “[b]y approving the general criminal plan

Accord Naletilić and Martinović, IT-98-34-T at¶ 59 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
19]); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 601 (Aug. 2, 2001) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 17]; Blaškić, IT-95-14-T at ¶ 279 [reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 11]; Musema, ICTR-96-13-T at ¶ 119) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20];
Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T at ¶ 37 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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Boas, supra note 8, at 356 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T at ¶ 30 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22]. Accord
Mpambara, ICTR-01-65-T at ¶ 20 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27]; Semanza, ICTR97-20-T at ¶ 380 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].
Kordić & Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-A at ¶ 982 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. See
discussion infra pp. 25.
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discussed on the 15 April 1993 meeting, acted with the awareness that there was a substantial
likelihood that the criminal conduct would be repeated.”53
(c)

Precluded from Being Held Liable for both Planning and Physically Committing
the Same Crime.

Recent judgments from the ad hoc tribunals establish that an accused may not be liable
for planning a crime and for physically perpetrating that same crime, for the reason that the
actual commission of the crime “absorbs” the lesser crime of planning.54 As a result, a tribunal
may only take into account a defendant‟s planning as an aggravating factor in sentencing.55
(d)

How Planning Differs from Complicity and Aiding & Abetting

The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Akayesu Judgment stated, “[p]lanning is similar to the
notion of complicity in Civil law, or conspiracy under Common Law . . . . But the difference is
that planning, unlike complicity or plotting can be an act committed by one person.”56 This
definition focuses on the key element common to complicity and conspiracy—an agreement
between two or more persons to commit a crime—that distinguishes them from planning. When
two or more people carry out a plan, no agreement is required.
Separately, William Schabas, Professor of International Law and Director of the Irish
Centre for Human Rights, argues that it is “inaccurate to associate „planning‟ with conspiracy as
it is intended in the common law, because conspiracy is an inchoate crime. „Planning‟ within the

53

Id.
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Cassese, supra note 44, at 226 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 443 (July 31, 2003) [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 16]; Kordić and Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T at ¶ 386-87 [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
55
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Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 480 (emphasis in original) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
24].
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meaning of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals is only criminal if the underlying crime is
committed.”57 To elaborate on Schabas‟ point, an accused cannot incur liability for having
engaged in planning if his planning did not contribute substantially to the actual commission of a
crime—with the exception provided for attempted genocide. Moreover, unlike conspiracy, an
individual cannot be convicted of both planning the crime and the actual commission of the
crime.
There is little legal scholarship or jurisprudence in the ad hoc tribunals that explores the
differences between the crime of aiding and abetting and the crime of planning in international
criminal law. Schabas explains that aiding and abetting in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes is a
“common law formulation of complicity.” 58 Black’s Law Dictionary defines an aider and abettor
as “[o]ne who assists another in the accomplishment of a common design or purpose; he must be
aware of, and consent, to such design or purpose.”59 There appears to be an agreement between
the aider and abettor and the person he is assisting, which differentiates aiding and abetting from
the crime of planning where no agreement is necessary.
In addition, according to the ICTR Akayesu judgment, “[a]iding means giving assistance
to someone. Abetting . . . would involve facilitating the commission of an act by being
sympathetic thereto.”60 The Trial Chamber in Akayesu concluded that either aiding or abetting
alone is “sufficient to render the perpetrator criminally liable.” 61 However, the ICTY in the
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Schabas, supra note 2, at 292 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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Id. at 292-93.

59

BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 68-69 (6th ed. 1990) [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6].
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Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 484 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Tadić case made no distinction between the two terms, choosing instead to address them
collectively. 62

III.

CASE STUDIES
The following case examples illustrate the type of facts the ad hoc tribunals consider

when assessing allegations of planning. The cases also demonstrate the type and quantity of
evidence that the tribunals have either found to be convincing or insufficient in establishing a
conviction. The case explanations include an analysis of relevant arguments made by the
prosecution and defense. Notably, the ICTR Trial Chamber‟s extensive treatment of planning in
the Bagilishema case offers many insights and lessons for the future.
The discussion centers on five indicators of planning—objective and subjective factors—
that the ad hoc tribunals have raised when assessing an individual‟s involvement in planning.
The objective factors are: (1) communications, (2) use of weapons and offensive use of force, (3)
physical presence at the scene of the crime, (4) position of authority, and (5) relationships with
other war criminals. Finally, there is a subjective factor—an accused‟s attitude or change in
attitude—that may reveal signs of his intent to plan, and provide a better understanding of his
actions overall.
A.

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications probably is the most common factor that the ad hoc tribunals address
when discussing allegations of planning. Naturally, when people engage in planning they tend to
discuss their plan with others, for example in private meetings or in public statements. They also
may document their planning preparations in writing, for example by drafting lists or

62

Tadić, IT-94-1-T at ¶ 689 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
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memoranda. As a result, communications may be the most tangible of all the factors because of
the likelihood that there is either documentation of a plan or portions of a plan, and the chance
that there are eyewitnesses who were present when the plan was being formulated.
i.

Meetings

(a)

Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR)—Attendance at Meetings Insufficient to Establish
Culpability of Accused; Absence of Evidence Demonstrating Genocidal Intent
Results in Acquittal.

In the ICTR case of Ignace Bagilishema, the prosecution repeatedly argued that the
meetings Bagilishema attended were dispositive of his criminal liability for “planning.”63 While
meetings are indicative of “planning,” their mere occurrence provides probative value only. The
prosecution must provide additional evidence—such as meeting minutes, timing of the meeting,
list of attendees, and an account of the discussion that took place—to support the contention that
the presence of the accused at a meeting demonstrates his participation in planning.
Ignace Bagilishema entered the Rwandan civil service in 1978. He first worked for the
Ministry of Youth. In 1980, he was appointed Bourgmestre, local mayor, of Mabanza commune
in the Kibuye Prefecture, a position that he held until mid-July 1994 when he fled the country for
former Zaire.64 Bagilishema‟s indictment alleged that, following the news of the death of
Rwandan President Habyarimna, Bagilishema attended several meetings between April 9-13,
1994, with the Prefect of Kibuye, Clement Kayishema, and other local authorities, including the
Commanding officer of the Gendarmerie Nationale stationed in Kibuye. 65 The Trial Chamber
considered each meeting separately to determine if the accused, at any point, participated in the
planning of genocide or crimes against humanity.
63

Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T at ¶ 458 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Id. at ¶ 7, 137 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Id. at ¶ 347.
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The Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution failed to present “any evidence to the
effect that the meeting of 9 April 1994 was held in furtherance of a plan to massacre Tutsi.”66
Although the accused admitted to attending a meeting in Kibuye town on April 9, 1994, the
prosecution presented no evidence—neither meeting minutes nor witnesses—to establish
Bagilishema‟s involvement in planning genocide.67 The prosecution presented a weak argument
in its rebuttal, claiming that the absence of meeting minutes should not exclude the possibility
that the attendees developed a genocidal plan on April 9. 68 The Trial Chamber appropriately
rejected this argument, focusing instead on the evidence provided by the defense.
The defense introduced a letter and report on the security situation in Kibuye—both dated
April 10, 1994—to support the argument that the meeting in question “addressed conventional
security concerns” rather than the planning of genocide. 69 The report described the gathering of
the security committee, including members of the restricted Prefectural Security Council,
bourgmestres, and representatives of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(“UNAMIR”).70 Bagilishema‟s testimony corroborated this information, acknowledging the
presence of UNAMIR at the 9 April meeting. 71
Bagilishema‟s indictment also alleged that he met with Prefect Clement Kayishema on
April 12, 1994, during which Kayishema told him that his commune was the only one left in

66

Id. at 352.
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Id. at 348-49.

Id. at 348 (“[I]n the absence of the Minutes of this Meeting the assumption that the meeting was not to
concert with a view to carrying out genocide is unattainable.”) (quoting Prosecution‟s Rebuttal, Sept. 14,
2000, 4, ¶14).
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Id. at 350.
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Id.
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Kibuye with “scum and filth.” 72 The prosecution claimed that this meeting was instrumental in
demonstrating the genocidal intent of the accused. The prosecution relied, however, on
witnesses who made contradictory statements and whose testimony was not corroborated.73 The
Trial Chamber concluded that the inconsistency in several witnesses‟ testimonies and the
discrepancies between the witnesses‟ earlier written statements and statements made in court
raised sufficient doubt as to whether the meeting ever occurred.74
The prosecution‟s failure to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a meeting took
place on April 12, 1994 between Bagilishema and Prefect Kayishema undermined the remaining
allegations against the accused. The prosecution framed Bagilishema‟s actions on April 13,
1994, and afterwards all within the context of the 12 April meeting, claiming that Bagilishema
acted pursuant to a “plan” decided upon during his meeting with Prefect Kayishema. The
prosecution stated that “[i]f you accept that the genocidal intent has been formed on the 12th
April . . . it is immaterial whether or not he was following them in a vehicle. Which was all in
the scheme of things. If he didn‟t follow them himself, he asked the communal police to follow
them.”75
The case against Bagilishema hinged on the Trial Chamber‟s affirming that at some point
prior to April 13, 1994, Bagilishema demonstrated the mens rea of possessing a specific
genocidal intent or general intent to commit crimes against humanity. Absent the requisite mens
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Id. at ¶ 376.
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Id. at ¶ 412, 417-18.

Id. at ¶ 418, 421 (recognizing that “the passage of time, trauma suffered by the witnesses, and the
context in which questions were posed” are all factors that potentially contribute to differences in a
person‟s earlier statements as compared to later statements. However, with respect to the 12 April
meeting, the Chamber concluded that the significant degree of inconsistency called into question the
credibility of the witnesses.).
74
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Id. at ¶ 423.
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rea, it was impossible for the Trial Chamber to view Bagilishema‟s actions as steps taken to
carry out a plan of genocide.
As the defense aptly illustrated, without a clear showing of the mens rea, Bagilishema‟s
actions appeared to be an attempt to protect the refugees. The defense submitted evidence that
following a telephone call Bagilishema received on the morning of 13 April from his counterpart
in Rutsiro, he “advise[d] refugees to go south, towards Kibuye town, as he feared that they
would be attacked by Abakiga coming from the north.”76 The record showed that the Abakiga
did attack the Mabanza commune on 13 April and in subsequent days, validating Bagilishema‟s
concern for the safety of the refugees if they stayed in Mabanza. 77 Furthermore, the defense
admitted that Bagilishema asked the communal police to escort the refugees to the halfway point.
Bagilishema also testified that he called Prefect Kayishema and asked him to provide an escort to
ensure the safety of the refugees for the remainder of the journey. 78
The Trial Chamber determined that the ultimate fate of the refugees in Kibuye town or in
the hands of Prefect Kayishema was not dispositive of Bagilishema‟s planning of genocide. The
Trial Chamber explained that the evidence did not show that Bagilishema should have known
what would happen to the refugees once in Kibuye town. 79 Furthermore, Bagilishema could not
be liable for planning if he was unaware of the existence of a plan and if he did not knowingly
participate in it. For these reasons, the Trial Chamber concluded that Bagilishema‟s explanation
that he acted out of concern for the safety of the refugees was plausible.80 The Chamber
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Id. at ¶ 425.
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Id. at ¶ 425, 457.
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Id. at ¶ 445.
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explained that since Bagilishema was unaware of a plan to kill the refugees by April 13, 1994,
his criminal liability—if any—would need to be based on subsequent events.81
(b)

Laurent Semanza (ICTR)—Defense Contends Lack of Meeting Specifics
Precludes Conviction on Planning.

The indictment of Laurent Semanza, Secretary of the Mouvement Democratique
Republicain (“MDR”) political party, alleged that “as of the beginning of 1994, [he] chaired
meetings to incite, plan and organize the massacres of the Tutsi civilian population.” 82 The Trial
Chamber‟s discussion of Semanza‟s role in planning is limited to the defense counsel‟s
contention that the indictment is too vague. The defense claimed that the “exceedingly broad
date ranges provide[d] grossly inadequate notice of particular conduct or events, making it
difficult for the Accused to prepare his defen[s]e.”83
(c)

Radislav Krstic (ICTY)—Lack of Operational Planning Pursuant to Meeting
Undermines Allegations that Accused had Knowledge of Plan

In the ICTY case of Radislav Kristic, the prosecution argued that because the plan to
execute Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica was “well-organized and comprehensive,” the Drina
Corps must have conducted it as a “military operation.”84 The prosecution claimed that General
Kristic‟s meetings with General Mladic between 9 and 13 July 1995 demonstrated Kristic‟s
direct involvement in the “development of the plan” from the beginning.85 The Trial Chamber
rejected this argument, explaining that there was no evidence to show Kristic made any
Id. at ¶ 458 (considering Bagilishema‟s presence at events from 13 to 18 April 1994. See discussion on
presence infra pp. 31.
81
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Semanza, ICTR-97-20-T, Annex I at ¶ 3.8 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 25].

83

Id. at ¶ 50 (The Defense Case).
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Krstić, IT-98-33-T at ¶ 85, 361

[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].
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Id. at ¶ 361.
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arrangements for the Srebrenica executions. 86 Furthermore, the Chamber recognized the
improbability that Kristic could have participated in planning the Srebrenica massacre when he
was in the midst of planning a separate operation at Zepa, which started on July 14, 1995, and
included several units of the Drina Corps.87 Finally, the Chamber concluded that although
Kristic “must have known the men were being separated . . . and taken to detention sites,” the
prosecution did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Kristic had “direct knowledge” that
the men would be executed.88
In summary, when providing evidence of meetings, it is imperative that the information is
specific. Meeting minutes, attendance lists, and agendas, for example, help to depict the nature
and content of the meeting and to determine the level of participation of the accused in the
meeting.
ii.

Public Statements

Public statements, such as those made on television or radio, are another type of
communication that should be considered when determining if an accused engaged in planning.
Tihomir Blaškić (ICTY)—An Example of Public Statements on Television as Evidence
of Planning
Tihomir Blaškić, commander of the Croatian Defense Council (“HVO”) 89 armed forces
headquarters in central Bosnia, was indicted for planning under Article 7 (1) of the ICTY
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 369.
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The HVO was established circa April 1992 and was the supreme executive, administrative, and defense
authority for the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (“HZ H-B”) and the Croatian Republic of
Herceg-Bosna (“HR H-B”). Kordic & Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T at p. 348, ¶ 4, 6 (Feb. 26, 2001) [reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
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Statute.90 General Blaškić did not actually perpetrate any of the alleged crimes (i.e., he lacked
the actus reus for the commission of the crimes), so he was held criminally responsible for the
crimes committed by others on the basis that he “planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of each of the crimes alleged.” 91
The Trial Chamber determined that the attack against the Muslim civilian population in
the early morning of April 16, 1993 had been a “planned” attack.92 According to the record, the
attack targeted nine villages and consisted of approximately twenty simultaneous sites of
combat.93 The Chamber considered several factors in reaching this conclusion, including the
content of public statements made by Blaškić both prior to the attack and following it.
Several witnesses who lived in the area at the time reported that Blaškić, as well as Dario
Kordić, a high-ranking Bosnian Croat party leader and Vice President Croatian Republic of
Herceg-Bosna,94 publicly declared their military intentions during a television interview
broadcast on April 15, 1993—one day before the attack. Blaškić and Kordić stated that because
of the Muslim assault on “their soldiers” in Nadioći, negotiations with the Muslims would end
since only war could resolve the matter.95 Additionally, a witness also alleged that one month
earlier, in March 1993, Kordić stated on television that the “Muslims would disappear from
Bosnia.”96
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Blaskic, IT-95-14-T at ¶ 9 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 11].
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In establishing liability for planning, the most useful public statements probably would be
those that articulate both an accused‟s political or military ambitions, for example, and indicate
the accused has either undertaken preparations already or is in the process of preparing to
achieve his goals.
iii.
(a)

Letters, Lists, and Other Written Documents

Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR)—Written Documentation Lends Credence to
Defense‟s Argument

Written documentation often has a high degree of probative value. Official and unofficial
letters or reports, for example, may assist the court in determining both the mens rea and the
actus reus of the accused. In the ICTR case of Bagilishema, the accused admitted to having
ordered the establishment in April 1994 of one “official” roadblock, known as Trafipro.97 He
denied, however, that he encouraged or was aware of crimes committed by those staffing the
Trafipro roadblock.98 Furthermore, he denied any involvement in the setting up of additional
“unofficial” roadblocks. He claimed that he took immediate action against unofficial roadblocks
when he learned of them. 99 In support of his claim, Bagilishema relied on a letter dated July 12,
1994, in which he asked two persons to remove unofficial roadblocks. 100
The prosecution, in its closing argument, asserted that Bagilishema‟s “responsibility lies
in the fact that in furtherance of a plan and in the execution of this plan . . . he, at some stage . . .
agreed to set up these roadblocks.” 101 Yet, the Trial Chamber explained Bagilishema could not
be held responsible for the crimes committed at Trafipro or any other roadblocks, if he did not
97
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possess the intent to use the roadblocks “to screen out and kill Tutsi civilians.” 102 Even if the
roadblocks were part of a genocidal plan, the record failed to demonstrate that Bagilishema was
aware of any such plan and that he contributed any substantial support to the roadblocks. The
Chamber supported its conclusion, in part, based on the written request in the letter to remove all
unofficial roadblocks.
(b)

Goran Jelisić (ICTY)—Evidence of Target Lists Fails to Support Allegations that
Accused Acted in a Deliberate Manner.

Goran Jelisić‟s indictment did not include allegations of planning.103 His case illustrates
that written documentation is insufficient evidence of a plan when the actions of the accused are
inconsistent with what is on the paper. The prosecution submitted into evidence several target
lists, one of which was mainly composed of names of local Muslim politicians or leaders within
the community.104 Some Witnesses in Jelisić‟s case claimed that he selected victims from these
lists of names.105 However, other witnesses testified that he randomly chose the victims. 106 The
Trial Chamber held “[i]t is not . . . possible to conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that the
choice of victims arose from a precise logic to destroy the most representative figures of the
Muslim community.”107
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Id. at 938.

Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 3, 7 (Dec. 14, 1999) (noting that Jelisić
underwent a psychiatric examination, but was declared fit to stand trial) [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 10].
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When operating from a list, a person presumably would be engaged in a plan of some sort
and act in a methodical and systematic manner to achieve the goals associated with the list. By
contrast, Jelisić‟s arbitrary actions indicated that he was acting without a plan.
The value of written documentation, similar to the evidence of meetings, depends
significantly on the availability of specific details. Furthermore, the information may be used to
illustrate inconsistencies in the accused‟s conduct or to demonstrate a pattern of behavior.
B.

WEAPONS AND OFFENSIVE USE OF FORCE

After communications, another key factor that demonstrates that the accused may be
involved in planning is his acquisition and distribution of weapons and/or his participation in the
use of organized force.108
Timhomir Blaškić (ICTY)—Methods of Attack Reveal Planning and Preparation
In the ICTY case of Tihomir Blaškić, commander of the HVO armed forces headquarters
in central Bosnia, the Trial Chamber emphasized that the method of attack could reveal the level
of preparation and planning undertaken by the perpetrators.109 The Chamber recognized that the
large scale of the assault of April 16, 1993, combined with its short duration, were signs of a
well-organized operation. 110 Although Blaškić attempted to escape liability by demonstrating he
did not have the authority to initiate an operation of this magnitude and asserting that the “order
came from a higher authority in the hierarchy,” he still was held responsible for the
implementation of a genocidal plan.111
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See discussion infra pp. 33-4 (referencing weapons distribution in the ICTR case of Jean-Bosco
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Specifically, the Trial Chamber held that the attack of April 16, 1993, the explosion of
the booby-trapped lorry on April 18, 1993, and the attack of July 18, 1993, could not have
occurred without the support of Blaškić.112 At the time, Blaškić controlled the local explosives
factory where the perpetrators of the 18 April bombing procured between 450 and 700 kilograms
of explosives to booby-trap the lorry—an amount that would have required Blaškić‟s
authorization.113 Similarly, Blaškić was the only person in the area entitled to authorize the use
of artillery. 114
The Trial Chamber recognized that since Blaškić was the “only one empowered to
authorize the use of the assets necessary to carry out [these] operations,” the troops must have
either obeyed Blaškić‟s orders or received his assistance.115 The Chamber concluded that “[t]he
quantity of arms and explosives used were clear evidence of the accused‟s involvement in the
organization and planning of those operations.”116
C.

PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME

Intuitively, the physical presence of the accused at the commission of a crime would
appear to be dispositive of his involvement in the planning of the crime. However, the judgment
in the ICTR Bagilishema case revealed that there are a number of reasons why an accused might
be on the scene of the crime.
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Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR)—Mere Presence at the Commission of the Crime Does Not
Establish Liability
The ICTR Trial Chamber emphasized, in the case of Bagilishema, that case law clearly
establishes that “mere presence at the scene of criminal events is not in itself incriminating.” 117
The Chamber recognized that the prosecution often uses presence at a crime scene to implicate
the accused in “other elements of participation in the crime.”118 For this reason, the Chamber
cautioned that an accused, particularly if he holds a position of authority, such as Bagilishema‟s,
could be linked by his presence to the perpetrators of the crime “unless he is seen to be actively
and demonstrably opposing the crimes.” 119 Accordingly, the Chamber insisted that the
prosecution provide evidence that contained sufficient detail to demonstrate the presence of the
accused at the crime scene and his role during the incident.120 Generally, a lack of detail in
eyewitness accounts and uncorroborated statements raise doubts about the presence of an
accused at a crime scene and his role, if any, in the planning and commission of a crime.
As for Bagilishema, the Trial Chamber held that the prosecution‟s evidence did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the stadium in Kibuye on April 13,
1994. The Chamber explained that even if the accused was there, the witnesses‟ testimonies
provided “little information about the purpose of [Bagilishema‟s] visit” to the stadium. 121 The
Chamber concluded that the evidence lacked a showing of criminal intent and since no crimes
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under the ICTR Statute had been committed in the stadium on 13 April, no criminal liability
attached to Bagilishema based on that day‟s events.122.
Similarly, the Trial Chamber determined that the evidence offered in support of
Bagilishema‟s presence at the stadium from 14 to 17 April lacked sufficient detail, contradicted
earlier statements by the witnesses, or appeared implausible. For example, one witness, who
claimed to be in a ground position inside the stadium, testified to having seen Bagilishema arrive
at the stadium in a car and speak to the gendarmes outside of the main stadium gate.123 The
Chamber questioned how the witness “was able to see [Bagilishema] through the stadium gates,
or . . . how she saw the car, which was parked on the other side of the stadium wall.” 124
Reviewing all of the evidence, the Chamber concluded that Bagilishema could not “bear direct
responsibility for the detention of the refugees or for the conditions of their detention” at the
stadium from 13 to 17 April 1994.125
D.

POSITION OF AUTHORITY

A defendant‟s position of authority may support allegations of his individual criminal
responsibility in war crimes, including the specific crime of planning. Furthermore, an
individual in a position of authority within a private or non-governmental entity may bear the
same degree of individual responsibility for war crimes as would a person in a public or state
leadership position. Yet, a person‟s lack of leadership or authority does not mean necessarily
that he bears any less criminal responsibility for the commission of a crime, as evidenced by the
judgment in the ICTR case of Laurent Semanza. Moreover, as seen in the ICTR case of Jean122
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Bosco Barayagwiza, a defendant‟s leadership position within a political party or other nongovernmental organization can provide access to resources and create opportunities to wield a
significant degree of influence over others.
(a)

Laurent Semanza (ICTR)—Lack of Official Leadership Position Does Not
Absolve Accused of Liability.

Although Laurent Semanza‟s indictment did not charge him with the crime of planning, it
alleged—as part of the crime of direct and public incitement—that he had chaired meetings
during which he “incited, planned, and organized the massacres of Tutsi civilians.”126 The
defense counsel argued that because Semanza did not hold an administrative or military position
within the Rwandan Government or within the Interhamwe militia he could not be held liable for
the criminal acts of these entities.127 The defense counsel asserted, albeit unsuccessfully, that
Semanza‟s lack of authority absolved him from bearing any criminal responsibility in the alleged
crimes, including any planning associated with the crimes in the indictment.128
(b)

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza—Non-Governmental Leadership Role Facilitates
Planning.

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza‟s leadership role as one of the founders of the political party
Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (“CDR”) and a principal board member of Radio
Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (“RTLM”) provided additional evidentiary support to
eyewitness accounts that he coordinated massacres against the Tutsi population. 129 The Trial
Chamber, describing Barayagwiza as being at the “organizational helm” of these groups,
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assessed that he had “direct involvement” in the “expression of genocidal intent and in genocidal
acts” undertaken by the CDR and its youth wing, the Impuzamugambi.130 Specifically, the Trial
Chamber concluded that Barayagwiza asserted a “leadership role” in the distribution of
weapons.131 Barayagwiza was found guilty of crimes against humanity for his “acts of planning
the killing of Tutsi civilians” under Article 3(b), pursuant to Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute. 132
Key evidence indicated that Barayagwiza went to the town of Gisenyi in April 1994—
one week after the shooting down of the President‟s plane—to oversee the delivery of a
truckload of guns and machetes. 133 A credible eyewitness saw Barayagwiza arrive in Gisenyi in
a separate vehicle, accompanying the truck of arms, and saw him speaking to the man whose
house served as the distribution center for the weapons. 134 The witness also identified members
of the CDR‟s youth wing, some of whom were wearing CDR caps, get out of the truck, and
unload the weapons. 135 That same day, the witness saw members of the CDR youth wing kill
thirty unarmed Tutsis with the weapons brought by Barayagwiza. 136 The Trial Chamber noted
that the eyewitness account of Barayagwiza‟s supervision of the operation was “supported by the
evidence of Barayagwiza‟s leadership role in the CDR.” 137
Although the Trial Chamber primarily relied on the testimony of one eyewitness with
respect to Barayagwiza‟s role in the distribution of the arms, the witness withstood extensive
cross-examination, his testimony was consistent with earlier statements, and he provided clear
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and detailed answers to questions. 138 Notably, he provided names, locations, distances, and
specific information “with precision.”139
In summary, while a leadership position—governmental or nongovernmental—factors
into any assessment of an accused‟s role in planning, it is not dispositive of his knowledge and
participation in a plan.
E.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER WAR CRIMINALS

The prosecution may use this final category of objective indicators to raise the
presumption that because of the accused‟s ties to individuals who orchestrated war crimes, he too
was involved in the planning of these crimes. It is essentially an attempt to establish guilt by
association. Both the prosecution and defense can exploit this factor by delving in the accused‟s
personal and professional relationships with other indicted or convicted war criminals.
Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR)—Ties to Convicted War Criminals May Strengthen or
Weaken Guilt by Association Claims.
The defense counsel in the ICTR case of Bagilishema conversely used this category to
illustrate that the accused had a “fractious relationship” with the indicted war criminal Laurent
Semanza. 140 The defense revealed the existence of a political rivalry between the two men in
order to disassociate Bagilishema from the war crimes committed by Semanza. By
demonstrating that Bagilishema and Semanza subscribed to different political and social policies,
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the defense undermined allegations by the prosecution that Bagilishema would have assisted
Semanza or participated in the planning of the crimes committed by Semanza. 141
F.

SUBJECTIVE INDICATOR: CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

This indicator appears to be fundamentally different from the previous five categories
because of its subjective nature. Although there is limited discussion of this factor in the ad hoc
tribunals, it could be helpful in assessing the intent of the accused with respect to planning, as
well as other modes of liability.
Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR)—Signs of a Change or Shift in Attitude May Reveal the
Accused‟s Intentions.
In his concurring opinion on the ICTR case of Bagilishema, Judge Asoka de Z.
Gunawardana disagreed with the prosecution‟s allegation that the accused, during a meeting on
April 12, 1994, “changed from having a bona fide intent to protect the Tutsis, to a genocidal
intent to exterminate” them. 142 Judge Gunawardana considered whether it is realistic for an
accused to have a dramatic change of attitude in such a short time span. The Judge reasoned that
a genuine “change of attitude” might have occurred if there were: (1) signs of the accused
succumbing to persuasion, and (2) signs that the alleged attitude change corresponded to
subsequent conduct of the accused. 143
Having created this test, Judge Gunawardana determined that Bagilishema‟s
circumstances did not meet the criteria. First, the prosecution did not present any evidence
suggesting that the Prefect Kayishema persuaded or pressured Bagilishema into changing his
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disposition with respect to the Tutsis.144 Second, Bagilishema‟s subsequent actions were not
consistent with those of someone who allegedly had changed his attitude by adopting a genocidal
intent. For example, the record indicated that after the alleged 12 April meeting with
Kayishema, Bagilishema visited the stadium and invited the refugees back to Mabanza where
peace had been restored.145 According to Judge Gunawardana, this offer by Bagilishema
appeared to be inconsistent with the prosecution‟s claim that he had decided to exterminate the
refugees. 146
While the ad hoc tribunals have yet to explore fully this subjective factor, Judge
Gunawardana‟s discussion offers unique insight, which may prove useful in assessing an
accused‟s intent and placing his conduct in perspective.

IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on precedent, to convict the accused of planning there must be consistent

documentary evidence or eyewitness testimony, which establishes the accused‟s intent and
demonstrates conduct that contributed substantially to the commission of the crime. As
illustrated by the case examples, proving intent can be particularly challenging since mere
presence at the commission of the crime or at a meeting usually is insufficient proof of intent.
In addition to credible documentation and eyewitness accounts, the ability to demonstrate
a recognizable pattern in the accused‟s actions—such as a taking a series of steps to procure and
distribute weapons—can add significant weight to the prosecution‟s arguments. Lastly, it is
important to recognize that planning does not need to be associated with a position of authority
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or leadership. While a senior ranking government official may be privy to resources and better
able to facilitate his planning, a person without an organizational title can equally be convicted of
planning.
Although the ad hoc tribunals have yet to convict an individual of war crimes based
solely on their participation in planning, the jurisprudence on planning is growing. War crimes
trials—such as that of former Liberian President Charles Taylor—offer the possibility of adding
to this expanding body of case law.
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